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INTRODUCTION 
Some people are beginning to doubt that courts are doing well in 
responding to recent social problems. I doubt it myself. Part of the 
problem may lie in the way the courts-and through the courts, lawyers 
generally-have conceived of the proper nature of judicial reasoning. 
There is a great deal about our court system, including its habitual pro-
cess of reasoning and argumentation, that is worth preserving; but 
change may be in order. 
The objective of this article is to investigate ways in which such 
change may be realized. The method of approach to the subject matter 
is somewhat unorthodox in appearance but can be seen as similar to any 
search for what Professor Wechsler has termed "neutral principles."1 
The particular unorthodoxy of this article lies in the attempt to examine 
what are now problems in the courts without the habitual use of the 
relevant legal terminology. The reader is therefore requested to tem-
porarily refrain from interjecting what may seem to be relevant legal 
concepts and doctrine so that any initial dissonance which may be felt 
does not cause rejection of the discussion solely because of the approach. 
RuLES AND SKILL 
Formulated rules, principles, and statutes are said to govern a case 
in court,2 and these commanding communications addressed to judges' 
theoretically guide and control the decisionmaking process. Rules 
whether derived from precedent or statute obviously constitute a real 
and important factor in judicial thinking and are the basic tools used. 
They just as obviously do not turn adjudication into a mechanical 
process since human thought is always necessary for their formulation, 
interpretation, and application. Statutes are, of necessity, general state-
ments of law which must be interpreted and applied to specific fact 
*B.A. 1965, J.D. 1967, LL.M. 1973, University of Texas at Austin; Member of the 
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l. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1 
(1959). . 
2Dickinson, Legal Rules: Their Function in the Process of Decision, 79 U. PA. L. 
REv. 833, 861 (1931). 
a See Cullison, Logical Analysis of Legal Doctrine: The Normative Structure of 
Positive Law, 53 IowA L. REv. 1209, 1210 (1968). 
1975] JUDICIAL REASONING AND SOCIAL CHANGE 259 
situations. For the application of a precedent or line of precedents, the 
court must first discover the correct rule of decision from opinions 
which may logically contain any number of rules as well as dicta.~ Thus, 
a court is never merely stating what the law is, but, necessarily, is decid-
ing to some extent what the law ought to be}1 
Mechanical use of rules, if possible, is suited only to a society which 
is relatively homogeneous and unchanging,6 or in which the political 
and social system disregards what the people want as long as they are 
controllable. The main attraction of rules, and their use in law, come 
from the advantages objective formulation offers to society. Forced 
judicial adherence to rules in decisionmaking, for example, restricts 
the discretion of judges who are, in the federal and some state systems, 
divorced from popular political controls. Rules, although often im-
precise, are subjected to the scrutiny of the legal profession which is 
trained to interpret their meaning and possible application in different 
fact situations. This, in turn, promotes a high degree of social and 
political stability since there is less amb!guity as to what constitutes 
permissible or required behavior. 
The obvious difficulty with adherence to "objfctive" standards is 
that it admits of no comprehensive and objective rule or method for 
changing law. This lack of flexibility is, in fact, one of the vital 
weaknesses of objective law. It is, however, just as obvious that courts 
do constantly change law either openly or covertly. Through a process 
described as synthesis and resynthesis, 7 they formulate new rules or 
reformulate old ones by lifting general language from a precedent and 
applying it differently, restricting the precedent's rule to its facts, or 
simply overruling prior cases. There is, however, intersubjective control 
~ Rules are not simply the summary of decisions, but when formulated provide a 
means of understanding them. See Christie, Objectivity in the Law, 78 YALE L.J. 1311, 
1316-19 (1969). 
11 Hart, Positivism atul the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARv. L. REv. 593, 606-
15 (1958); McCoy, Logic vs. Value !ttdgment in Legal and Ethical Thought, 23 VAND. 
L. REv. 1277, 1286 (1970). 
6 The highly formal images suggested by an extreme positivist approach to law are 
descriptive of a static political universe in which human inconsistl!l1cy and the variability 
of social conditions play a relatively insignificant part Cf. Shubert, Behavioral Jurispru-
dence, 2 LAW & Soc. REv. 407, 41Q-11 (1968). 
7 What may be called the Levi method of legal reasoning describes a process of 
"moving classification." Law is said to consist of rules, however imprecise, derived from 
precedents and statutes, and new rules must encompass the rele\ ant statutes, the over-
ruled prior cases, and the new case. Any prior case which does not fit into this single 
rule must be overruled. See generally H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTion TO LEGAL REAsoNING 
(1948); Levi, The Nature of Judicial Reasoning, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 395, 39~3 (1965). 
See also K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BusH 56-59 (1951), dismssed in Christie, supra 
note 4, at 1318-19. 
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of this process in that judges are trained in a specific mode with known 
and visible techniques, and are guided by the goal of common sense.8 
Thus, any subjective discretion will always be controlled by a judge's 
"knowledge of the whole body of law and the interdependence of its 
parts" which he cannot eliminate "even if he wishes."9 Training and 
experience is reflected also by the fact that if a judge does deviate, there 
is little chance that he can influence others to follow him.10 
Knowledge of the legal skill or art does not provide effective criteria 
for controlling change, and even though judges may be guided by 
common sense or logic, they are not ruled by it.11 Common sense does 
not tell a judge how far he should range in accumulating reasons for or 
against a particular proposition, which reasons he must consider or 
disregard, or how he should weigh the reasons presented. He may, 
in some instances, react intuitively or emotionally to a case and there-
after construct a logical set of legal propositions which played no 
part in his decision but which justify his subjective conclusion.12 The 
concept of logic is of little assistance since it essentially focuses on the 
"sequential" form of analysis rather than its content; this means that 
it is concerned solely with the validity of an inference from facts and 
assumptions that are assumed to be valid, and is independent of ques-
tions of observable reality.13 Thus it is not unlikely that both sides of 
a case may be supported by faultless logic.14 
Acknowledging that subjective human thought processes play an 
important part in judicial decisionmaking, and assuming that the exist-
ing professional intersubjective agreements do not provide a satisfactory 
illumination of rule changing,15 we cannot hope to know how decisions 
s See Christie, snpra note 4, at 1321. 
0 J. FRANK, LAw AND THE MoDERN MIND 283 (1930). 
10 See id. at 282-84. 
11 See· Cullison, snpra hote 3, at 1267. The "law" that finds expression in court deci-
sions includes essentially only what the deciding judges choose to follow. Halper, LogiC' 
in htdicial Reasoning, 44 IND. L.J. 33, 38 (1968). 
12 See J. FRANK, supra note 9, at 281-84. An easing of this charge is that the long 
training and experience of the judge permits him to see the picture before he can fill in 
the details. His subsequent consideration may well include an evaluation of the initial 
reaction through reasoned analysis. See Sinclair, Legal Reasoning: In Search of an 
Adequate Theory of Argumentation, 59 CALIF. L. REv. 821, 826 (1971). A realist argu-
ment is that the stated rules of law conceal, more than explain, the bases of judicial de-
cision, and this concealment may be complicated by the conception of law as a symmetri-
cal structure of logical propositions. Under this concept truth or error may be implicitly 
decided by whether a decision fits into the structure. See Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its 
Catese attd Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037, 1038 (1961). 
1s Halper, stepra note 11, at 39. 
14 See generally J. FRANK, supra note 9, at 281. 
15 See generally Gilmore, supra note 12. The author argues that the loosening of the 
problems caused by stare decisis will come about through a movement toward the use of 
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are made until we understand the guiding motivations of judges in their 
professional behavior. 
FACTORS INFLUENCING DECISION MAKING AND CHANGE 
Attitudes 
An individual's analytical thought is based upon his general philo-
sophy of life or his central values. Even though judges as a group would 
accept certain common values, such as freedom and equality, different 
judges may hold to various orderings of priorities among these values.16 
A "conservative" judge may place individual freedom in a higher status 
within his scale of accepted values, and this ordering will be determin-
ative of his attitude formation. In turn, these attitudes will affect the 
way in which he identifies with differing legal positions. An argument 
which is perceived as upholding this higher value will usually be better 
received than one which emphasizes equality at the expense of indivi-
dual freedoms.17 
This judge will also have a whole structure of attitudes reinforcing 
this value scale. Included in this scheme will be attitudes which rep-
resent the judge's ideas on substantive and procedural matters, as well 
as those relating to the judicial and governmental structure. An entire 
structure of attitudes is thereby formed which arises from the initial 
value choice and extends even to decisions on more routine judicial ac-
tivities. This structure will also include defensive attitudes which allow 
rejection of arguments which seriously question the validity of the 
judge's mental order. These may include what we call biases or pre-
judices which allow the judge to avoid matters which cannot be as-
similated into his scheme of attitudes. These may al!ow him to see any 
threatening argument as "irrational" or "nonsensical'' and thereby avoid 
the need for examination of his own prejudgments. The whole struc-
more general principles, :;tatutory policies, and codified standards as decisionmaking 
guides. If this is truly a prophetic statement, such a trend would intensify the need for 
understanding human decisionmaking behavior since these procesoes would become more 
important in relation to the generality of the objective standards. 
lOSee geuerall~· D. BEM, BELIEFS, ATriTUDES, AND HuMAN AFFAIRS 4-13 (1970). 
17 Id. 
An attitude is defined as the nonconscious predisposition of an individual to evaluate 
some thing or person in a favorable or unfavorable manner. A bdie£ is an extension of 
an attitude on the conscious level. The relationship of attitudes and beliefs is dialectic 
in that conclusions consciously arrived at are affected by nonconscious predispositions and, 
in turn, affect and modify the predispositions. An attitude remains more stable because 
of its generality and its nonconscious state while beliefs are mor.~ vulner;tble to change 
because of their habitual clash with contradictions. D. Grimland, Mainstreams of Atti-
tude Research 1945-1965, Aug. 1967, at 3 (unpublished M.A. thesis in the University of 
Texas at Austin Library). 
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ture of attitudes provides a means for reaching the judge's precon-
ceived goals and for avoiding what may be implicitly thought of as 
bad or punishable activity. 
Attitudes as to what constitutes punishable activity are often com-
parable to conditioned responses.18 People are simply conditioned 
throughout their lives to react in certain ways to various words, ideas, 
or actions. An example is the reaction to "indecent" or "obscene" matter. 
A person is taught through early punishment or equivalent experience 
that "obscene" words or acts are "bad" and will bring pain or depriva-
tion of reward.19 A judge who has not been exposed to any influence 
which retards the force of this teaching will react with abhorrence to 
"obscene" material or activities. His immediate response will be toward 
punishing the actor involved because he knows that such people are to 
be treated in this way. The severity of his response may also be related 
to the situation; that is, the expression of such words in more punish-
able circumstances (i.e., before a mixed audience) intensifies his abhor-
rence.20 
This reaction is not rationally connected to the information, idea, or 
concept behind the expression, but is related primarily to the judge's 
conditioning as to the act of expression itself. In essence, conditioning 
of this sort determines the way in which human beings make conscious 
decisions whether they realize it or not. The basis for a conclusion that 
obscenity is bad may be unknown,21 but nevertheless this conclusion 
significantly affects the way in which people behave and order their lives. 
Whether conclusions arrived at in this manner are labeled "value 
judgments," or not, is of little importance; the point is that individuals 
do act, order their lives, and order the lives of others on such a basis.22 
Accordingly, a simple admonition to remain neutral and open-
minded in evaluation of the reasons for or against legal change is to 
some extent simplistic without the investigation of how objective reality 
comes to be implicit and unquestioned in the minds of judges. This 
investigation includes the ways in which reality is structured and how 
this structuring conditions human beings to think in predetermined ways. 
18 See discussion in D. BEM, supra note 16, 40-53. This illogical response to com-
munication is termed "semantic generalization." 
19 Id. at 42-43. 
2° Cf. id. 
21 See C. Myers, Ricoeur's Phenomenology of the Will: A Critical Examination 
from the Perspective of Husserl's Phenomenology, May 1969, at 47 (unpublished M.A. 
thesis in the University of Texas at Austin Library). 
22 I d. 
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Social Institutions 
To have any cohesion a society must operate to a great extent upon 
an intersubjective agreement as to the nature of reality within that 
society. 23 Even in a modern, complex society there is the need for a 
shared core of agreements as to reality and the goals of society which 
are formulated in respect to that reality.24 These agreements as to what 
is reality affect all decisions on what the law should be, extending even 
to how one should behave in all sorts of public and private situations. 
To operate efficiently an individual must follow what society has 
said are the facts of social life, and he finally must be able to accept 
this socialization to the point that he knows what proper behavior is. In 
this way, the facts of life and the way to react to those facts are largely 
predetermfned and inculcated in people within society. This agreed-
upon, socially constructed reality and the predetermined modes of be-
havior that go along with it influence and channel human behavior. 
The inherent biological limitations of man are also such that he must 
function in accordance with some type of unques6oned assumption as 
to reality.2 " He simply cannot reexamine each social or private situa-
tion and make constant conscious decisions about his behavior. 
Generally an individual neither recognizes that his behavior is con-
trolled or guided in this way, nor that the patterning itself derives from 
accepted human decisions. The individual thinks of himself as one who 
has no control over what to him is common sense reality, and as one who 
acts in such a way because of the unquestionable validity of this reality. 
Likewise individuals may be unaware of the process of typification 
through which they attempt to deal with others. In order to operate 
within a society of human beings, a person must •:ategorize or typify 
others so that he does not have to evaluate each individual with whom 
2SSee P. BERGER & T. LuCKMANN, THE SoCIAL CoNSTRUCTION oF REALITY 125 (pa-
perback ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as BERGER & LUCKMANN]. 
In this regard, intersubjective agreement means 
what is (especially cognitively) common to various individuals. In daily life, a 
person takes the existence of others for granted. He reas )ns and acts on the 
self-understood assumption that these others are basically persons like himself, 
endowed with consciousness and will, desires and emotions. The bulk of one's 
ongoing life experiences confirms and reinforces the convict,on that, in principle 
and under "normal" circumstances, persons in contact with one another "under-
stand" each other at least to the degree to which they are able to deal success-
fully with one another. 
A. ScHuTz, ON PHENOMENOLOGY AND SociAL RELATIONS 319 (paperback ed. H. Wagner 
1970) (glossary). 
uSee id. at 51-52. 
26 Although the social order is not derived from biological data, the necessity for 
social order as such stems from man's biological equipment. Id. at 52. 
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he comes into contact. Accordingly, we place others in categories which 
in our minds call for certain patterns of behavior on our part. Think, 
for instance, of the different attitude and approach taken when con-
fronting a "Professor" and a "Student." The labels trigger different 
images and thereby different reactions. People also expect a "Professor" 
to behave in a certain manner. 
Such stereotyping or typifying of other people in society is most 
difficult where there are constant face-to-face relationships between a 
person and a member of one of his stereotyped classes.26 The more 
individual characteristics of the other person are brought home in a 
direct manner, the more the differences between these and the artificial 
characteristics making up the stereotyped concept become visible, and 
this tends to cause what may be at least an unconscious tendency to 
question the stereotyped attitude. Where, however, this face-to-face 
confrontation is not available, the stereotyped attitude toward other 
classes of people remains largely untested and unquestioned.2.7 The 
general effect is that the stereotype becomes an implicit attitude which 
is taken to be validly based upon "true" reality. This is to say that these 
embedded and unquestioned attitudes become a person's view of reality 
as he conceives such to be in his society. The implication is that in-
dividuals, including judges, may well go about their lives making deci-
sions as to their relationships with others based upon such attitudes. 
When societal typifications become problematical the effect on the 
law may be dramatic. Civil rights activities and the more recent emer-
gence of the women's movement are obvious examples. As to the latter, 
taken-for-granted assumptions that women belong in the home, that 
they are not suitable for many types of employment, and that they have 
a lesser status in the eyes of the law have all been brought into ques-
tion both through public and political protest and through legal chal-
lenge. This "consciousness-raising" is based upon a critical analysis of 
implicit assumptions or prejudgments and their implications for the in-
dividuals involved. 
The law not only represents the accepted modes of behavior in this 
society, but also enforces and reinforces these accepted modes of be-
havior. Thus the law strengthens accepted patterns. Furthermore, it 
defines for people in the society the "correct" way of behaving and 
ordering their everyday lives. This effect is present even without the 
penal sanctions which are a part of the enforcement machinery of this 
2s I d. at 30-32. 
27 Id. 
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particular institution. Many, if not most, people t·:!nd to act according 
to law without consciously assessing the possibility of legal punishment. 
A driver who runs a stop sign on a lonely road where there is no chance 
of collision or of being caught by the police may still feel strangely 
uneasy with himself. Thus, institutional definitions of proper conduct 
become to a large extent subsumed in individual attitudes toward reality. 
The law is perceived as an objective reality, and human activity gradually 
becomes more forcefully guided by it.28 Individu1ls act according to 
the law because they know it to be the "right" way even though the 
reasons for determining this rightness are obscured in the past.29 
An institutional world can in this way become or be experienced as 
an objective reality. The people who must live with or within an insti-
tution may forget that this world and this objective reality are basically 
creations of human beings with all their own inconsistencies and are not 
natural or ontological truths of life.30 They view this reality as 
being other than a human product and most often unconsciously imbue 
it with characteristics of validity which are separate and above human 
control or questioning.31 Even laws which are repealed or overruled 
leave behind them the inculcated patterns of thought and habitualized 
behavior which continue to control the activities of people. This is 
especially true where these laws were of long standing and were part of 
a whole scheme of related law sand social agreements. 
An example of this can be seen in the school desegregation cases 
which began with Brown v. Board of Education32 in 1954 where enforced 
segregation in public schools was held unconstitutional. In 1968, in 
light of the lack of progress made toward removal of a dual system, the 
Court held that a "freedom-of-choice" plan did not satisfy the Brown 
rule, thereby holding that school boards have an affirmative duty to 
integrate. 33 
A reason for this shift can be seen in the fact that the simple re-
moval of legally enforced segregation had not worked to remedy the 
28 Control of human behavior and thought is inherent in institutionalization. One of 
the most important gains is that institutions control human conduct by setting up pre-
defined patterns of conduct so that each person will be able to predict the actions of 
others. See id. at 54-57. 
2D Definitions of reality may be enforced no matter what their practicality by the 
use or threat of force so that they begin to be validated "by social rather than empirical 
support." ld. at 119. 
so This apprehension of human phenomena as nonhuman things works toward the 
dehumanization of the social and institutional worlds. See id. at 21, 89-90. 
31 Man is in this way capable of forgetting his own authorship of the human world 
and the dialectic relationship between man and his products. ld. at 90. 
32 349 u.s. 294 (1955). 
33 Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968). 
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major perceived ills caused by a dual system of education. This so-
called "freedom-of-choice" plan did not lead to significant changes in 
ingrained habits of thought and action.84 The many years of legally 
enforced separation in education in conjunction with numerous other 
socially enforced separations could not but have reinforced people's ac-
ceptance of this mode of social ordering as an objective reality-a 
fact of life. While the law itself could be overruled with one decision, 
neither the perceived social reality nor the effect of decades of reinforce-
ment of those social patterns could be changed as quickly. 
Obviously judges are not immune to this process. It is difficult for 
them, as for any individual, to look beyond what appears to them to be 
objective reality. It is difficult because the knowledge which a judge 
gains through his socialization and the law's institutionalization is often 
taken to be coextensive with the knowable or at least the rational knowl-
edge available.35 It is very difficult to argue that a judge does not under-
stand what present reality is, either in everyday life or in the law.36 To 
do so to some extent questions part of his basic knowledge which 
guides his professional activities. It is also extremely difficult to ferret 
out predispositions or biases which may be not only hidden but cemented 
under taken-for-granted attitudes as to their ultimate validity. 
Another obstacle to judicial objectivity is created by the fact that 
the law as an institution has to be justified. In order to efficiently trans-
mit the old social reality to the young or to the disenchanted, experts must 
seek to formulate consistent and comprehensive theories to explain and 
justify the old way of doing things.37 Often, these theories are sup-
ported by symbols which must themselves be presumed valid. In law 
this would be similar to justification of a particular rule by reference 
to a legal myth or fiction. To analyze the legal myth or fiction would 
lead either to circular movement within the system or to the adminis-
trative or bureaucratic needs underlying the myth. 
8~ This is not, of course, to say that other factors do not contribute to continuing 
separation in schools. 
35 "What is taken for granted as !mow ledge in the society comes to be coextensive 
with the Imowable, or at any rate provides the framework within which anything not yet 
!mown wiii come to be !mown in the future." BERGER & LUCKMANN at 66. 
so This problem is related to the workings of defensive attitudes which serve to 
protect a person's mental thought structure. 
s1 One can only speak of a social world with the appearance of a new generation. 
The old generation helped create the world and its reality, and they are part of it. The 
transmission of their social reality requires the interpretation of its meanings in theoreti-
cal forms which must be consistent and comprehensive in order to better justify its con-
trol of others. The young are more likely to deviate from programs set up by others 
than from those set up by themselves. See BERGER & LucKMANN at 61-62. 
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Eventually the justifications take on a validity or reality of their 
own. Theoretical justification of institutional acts not only gives dignity 
to the matters in question, but also influences decisionmakers and in 
this way creates its own additions or modifications to institutional 
reality.38 For example, the judge who decides a case on the basis of a 
legal myth or fiction thereby creates an extension of the existing law 
which must be lived with in the society and which may, in turn, decide 
other cases.30 In this way, theoretical justification can stimulate further 
reality construction which may all be unsupported by factual reasons 
in the present social environment. 
Similarly the theoretical superstructure in which the judge is trained 
may subtly demand consistencies with social and kgal structures which 
have little to do with the human objects of law. A judge, who is vulner-
able to the same socialization as all people and holds an important 
position within the legal institution, is also a legal theoretician. His 
mental attitude structure will undoubtedly be attuned to the social and 
institutional framework in which it was formed and to which he has 
contributed. His values and goals will be imbedded in established law and 
procedure which may be viewed as the necessary and proper implementa-
tion of these values and goals. The fear of profe5sional disfavor will 
also reinforce any personal restraints which cause a tendency to recoil 
from radical change. 
Language 
Language formulation is another way in which the thought pro-
cesses and behavior of individuals may be controlled and conditioned. 
Language acts as the representation of constructed reality and contri-
butes its own influence in validating that reality.40 It is formulated 
38 A principle of law which is said to underlie more particular rules will cause the 
rules to be modified so as to better accord with the principle. In turn, new rules will be 
formulated to better serve the accepted basic principle. It must be remembered that this 
discussion seeks only to point out how law may subtly move away from its human base. 
39 Theoretical justification creates its own objective reality which may implicitly be 
used to further validate the theoretical structure through a "snowball" effect. The mass-
ing of many particular rules all pointing to one way of doing things may exert a tre-
mendous psychological influence upon individuals which forces them to accept without 
question those dictates. 
40 Language originates in everyday life. It refers above all to the reality experienced 
in everyday life which is dominated by the pragmatic motive to "get along." Language 
also typifies experiences, allowing them to be subsumed under broad categories which 
have meaning to an individual and to his fellowmen. The continuing use of the same 
language to objectify and understand these experiences has a fllndamental reality-main-
taining effect. See BERGER & LUCK:MANN at 38-39, 154; Probert, Word Consciousness: 
Law a11tl tlze Control of La11gttage, 23 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 374 (1972); McCoy, supra 
note 5, at 1279. 
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specifically to aid people to operate within a society, and its common 
meanings bind individuals to a common way of thinking. Expression 
s~rves the individual need for objectifying thoughts and ideas; for 
these to be intelligible in communication they must be molded to the 
available linguistic tools. Once objectified in a common language, these 
ideas represent the speaker and he, in turn, seeks to accommodate his 
thinking to what his expressed ideas stand for. In psychological terms 
he will seek consonance or consistency between his actual ideas and 
those he expresses with an added strain toward remaining faithful to 
his public opinions because of ego-involvement. The goal in discussing 
language and the law is not to formulate a description or theory of such 
language use-a task as impossible as the formulation of a compre-
hensive theory of the analytical model used in judicial decisionmaking.41 
The goal is, instead, an attempt to clarify and explain ways in which 
legal discourse may hamper critical judicial analysis of legal problems. 
In law we may know the facts about some matter and yet look at 
them mistakenly ;42 likewise, the words we use to characterize these 
matters may carry these misconceptions even with the most determined 
effort toward precise definition. Further, these words may be ~pplied for 
various reasons as descriptions or prescriptions which do not accord 
with their original or common meanings.48 The difficulties with preci-
sion of analysis may, therefore, come from not only misuse and mis-
application of language, but also from confusion of ordinary and techni-
cal meanings. Even the most technical use of a word may involve 
implicit emotional connotations which can confuse the technical issues 
at stake. An example of this is apparent in the current legal question-
"Is a fetus a human being?" This issue which parades as a fact ques-
tion is really concerned with whether or not a fetus is to be given legal 
protection.44 The initial confusion is made more difficult by the tremen-
dous emotional freight carried by this phrasing. 
Language is also part of the socialization process. Through a 
dynamic dialectical relationship language can be modified by the objec-
tive reality of society and, in turn, through its own nature modify this 
objective reality.45 Also, to the degree it remains constant, language 
41 See J. BRKIC, NoRM AND ORDER 12 (1970). 
42 See Austin, A Plea for Excuses, in ORDINARY LANGUAGE: EssAYS IN PHILOSOPHI-
CAL METHOD 41, 55 (V. Chappell ed. 1964). 
4S The common meaning may unconsciously modify the technical application o£ a 
term. 
44See Rosen v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 318 F. Supp. 1217, 1236 
n.6 (E.D. La. 1970) ; McCoy, supra note 5, at 1288. 
45 See id. at 1283-85. 
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works to maintain the socially determined reality. The continuing use 
of the same language to describe experiences tends to solidify or stabilize 
the ways in which people think about these experiences. In this way, 
language is a major instrument for ordering and controlling the be-
havior of individuals within a society. Even the conception of new 
modes of behavior, whether social or legal, is initially difficult without 
a change in the common language or a reinterpretation46 of the relevant 
parts. 
In the law the whole process of structuring human fact situations 
so as to be legally relevant involves the reinterpretation of these facts 
in order to make them fit the language of prior cases or legal rules. This 
remolding of facts to fit preordained linguistic molds can become the 
equivalent of legal logic; and one who strays from these guidelines may 
be considered irrational, or worse, irrelevant.47 This equivalency is 
enforced even if language must be remolded in the process. 48 
Here again the need to question the objective realities constructed 
by legal institutions is manifest. The court, for instance, may subtly 
lose awareness of the fact that a certain mode of behavior has been 
included in or excluded from a linguistically e..~pressed category of 
legal protection solely because of a human decision to do so.49 The 
tendency is then to accept such categorization as reality or as a fact of 
nature. Thus, in criminal abortion reform cases the struggle may be 
concerned with the comparison of a fetus and visible members of society, 
leaving untouched the basic reasons for protecting human beings.50 
It is also obvious that legal language used ~n argumentation to 
courts, as well as that used to justify court opiniom, can and often does 
carry factors meant to move those addressed. The ;e are most convinc-
ing when hidden within the language itself, such as through the phrasing 
of issues in terms which channel the analytical process in one or the 
other direction. In many ways the statement of the legal question will 
46 See BERGER & LucKMANN at 159. 
47 Language provides the fundamental superimposition of logic on the legal world. 
The theoretical justifications for the legal system are built upon language, and language 
is used as the legal system's basic instrumentality. Cf. id. at 64. 
48 If language does not change, legal logic can represent little more than the exces-
sive adherence to the literal or settled meaning of a legal term and be ultimately decried 
as "the bark of a hard and narrow verbalism." Schuylkill Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania, 296 
U.S. 113, 129 (1935) (Cardozo, .T., dissenting). This structuring of legal language tends 
to present a more or less neatly ordered field of thought. Legal conceptualization may 
cause a court to recoil from challenges to established law because these challenges must 
to some extent intrude upon the thought patterns associated with those laws. 
49 See McCoy, supra note 5, at 1279, 1283-85. 
50 See generally Rosen v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 318 F. Supp. 
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determine the legal conclusion drawn. Not only will constructed and 
established legal language work toward the acceptance of -a phrasing 
which fits within the system, but once the issue is so phrased the estab-
lished patterns for analytical thought will inexorably move the process 
toward an acceptable decision within the same system. 51 A failure to 
question the underlying prejudgments thus forces the analytical process 
along a path within the existing system and its established and self-
supporting parts. 
One way of breaking these tendencies toward institutional closure 
is by a heightened awareness of words used in law.52 A legal term may 
be elucidated by the investigation of the standard conditions in which a 
statement containing it was true. This is a reference to the original 
meaning of the word as it was brought into legal usage. This allows a 
weighing of its relevance to the present or challenged usage which in 
turn may require careful reinterpretation according to present needs for 
relating law to changing social conditions. In abortion cases this would 
involve a recognition of the specific instances in which human life is 
legally protected and why this is so. This examination would allow 
reasoned analysis of the distinctions available between the usual cause 
of protection and the protection of a fetus. 
The intellectual abstraction, which is much of legal language, be-
comes problematical when conditions deny the appropriateness of the 
abstraction and call for reinterpretation. Bringing about this conceptual 
change is essential if law is to remain relevant and controlling in society. 
The language of law may never be, or never be required to be, totally 
understandable to laymen since it is concerned with institutional 
machinery with which laymen are not usually acquainted. The need 
is not for painful dissection of each verb, adverb, noun, pronoun, prep-
osition, and adjective, but the realization of the limitations and restric-
tions upon legal thought inherent in the use of structured language as 
they relate to the flexibility of judicial lawmaking. The need is for an 
understanding of the part played by language in the constitution of 
facts and of the fact that to a great extent the limits of the language 
used by an individual or an institution are the limits of their worlds and 
what is considered rational within them. 53 
1217 (E.D. La. 1970). 
51 See McCoy, sttPra note 5, at 1279. 
52 This sharpened awareness of words is necessary so that we may also sharpen our 
perception of the phenomena they represent It is not, however, to be construed as the 
judging of the phenomena. Austin, sttpra note 42, at 47. 
53 S. ERicKSON, LANGUAGE AND BEING: AN ANALYTIC PHENOMENOLOGY 100 (1970). 
1975] JUDICIAL REASONING AND SOCIAL CHANGE 271 
CRITICAL DECISIONMAKING 
The aim of a truly critical judicial analysis must be to question the 
attitudinal, social and linguistic factors which create what appears to 
be the objective reality. An unquestioned acceptance of the validity of 
the constructed reality supports the legal status quo, violates the neu-
trality of the judiciary, and inhibits the ability of the legal system and 
the judiciary in thoughtful evaluation of legal change. When a distinc-
tively new rule of law is proposed in regard to wh:tt has become a con-
troversial issue, reference solely to established tools in the appellate 
decisionmaking process overlooks the essential difference of this type of 
problem. These established substantive tools or propositions have been 
formulated on the basis of accepted views of reality and accepted con-
clusions as to human action in regard to that reality. The law is said 
to follow society and to be based on the generally accepted values and 
morals of society. Controversy, however, is evidence of a breakdown 
in the general agreement as to a particular view of reality, as to the con-
clusions to be drawn from that view of reality, and as to the definition or 
application of related values.64 When substantial controversy exists, 
appellate decisionmaking must move away from the descriptive and 
normative propositions which would ordinarily be used in resolving the 
issue because it is these very propositions and what they represent which 
are, in fact, being challenged. 65 
Modification is required in the decisionmaking process as applied to 
this type of issue in order to retain neutrality as to the values involved. 
When society no longer agrees upon a socially constructed fact, judicial 
adherence to the old fact is not value neutral. Neither can the courts 
simply accept a new idea and apply unique methods of resolution and 
decision which place that idea into law. Courts may well sympathize 
with the new idea, but they cannot simply accept tbat idea and a whole 
scheme of new, supporting justifications-new in the sense of not 
having been established in previous judicial decisionmaking. Any new 
structure of justifications, if one is even available, will lack the char-
acteristics of objectivity; and, therefore, any such opinion appears 
subjective, as judicial legislation, or as an attempt at imposition of the 
court's morals on society-in effect, the opinion will not meet the re-
quired standards for legal logic. 56 
Even though a challenge to the legal status quo reflects a changed 
54 Cf. Levy-Bruhl, Tlze So11rces of Law: Otttlines of a Th.·ory, 38 U. CIN. L. REv. 
663, 667 (1969). 
55 Cf. id. at 673. 
50 See Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CoRNELL L.Q. 17, 24 (1924). 
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awareness of the involved social situation and, for success, must escape 
the application of established propositions which reflect the old, un-
changed awareness, it must somehow enable the court to resolve the 
issues favorably through an objective, legal method.57 The resolution 
as expressed in an opinion must be based on objective propositions. If 
not, the court must ask society and the legal profession to accept a new 
determination in regard to the particular situation based on new proposi-
tions which themselves have not been tested and accepted as valid. 
Ideally, the court must avoid analysis of the issue on the basis of 
those normally relevant propositions which undercut the apparent valid-
ity of the desired conclusion. It must also present supporting proposi-
tions which are objective-propositions which have been articulated 
and tested in the crucible of judicial discussion and criticism. It must 
justify its reliance upon established law other than that usually thought 
relevant to the solution of the particular problem. In essence, it must 
justify a change of perspective in regard to the reality of the situation 
involved. 
Since the initial difficulty in accomplishing this lies in the hidden 
assumptions underlying conscious ideas which are reflected and rein-
forced by the terminology used to describe those ideas, one must begin 
by seeking new but applicable ways of describing and discussing the 
problem situation. In the beginning of the process of change, there may 
be little or no concept of what the new terminology might be or in 
which direction it might lead. Once a tentative analogy and possible 
new argument in regard to the problem becomes known, the remolding 
of descriptive terminology can be guided by the end to be reached. 
By purposely describing a problem situation in different ways, a 
court can compensate for the subtle controls inherent in language and 
break out of what, on occasion, might appear to be a conceptual box. 
The purpose is to find a new way to state the question so that, in effect, 
it can justify a new way of answering that question. Analysis is a tool 
to be used in legal problem-solving and holds no magic when separated 
from that purpose. In presenting any new description, the words used 
cannot be unbiased but must be reasonably applicable. Since words 
reflect the view of reality prevailing in society and since that view is 
to be challenged to the extent it justifies the old law, change in descrip-
tive terminology may supply a changed or more comprehensive perspec-
tive. Change in terminology also works to break the ties between the way 
in which the problem is usually described and the way in which it is 
57 Cf. Levy-Bruhl, Sttpra note 54, at 688-89. 
1975] JUDICIAL REASONING AND SOCIAL CHANGE 273 
usually resolved. In essence, the method involves a varying of the 
elements which control perception of the problem so that there can be a 
varying of the way in which its resolution may be conceived. 
Two EXAMPLEs oF CRITICAL AN !.LYSIS 
The Abortion Issue 
In Roe v. Wade58 the United States Supreme Court struggled with 
the issues involved in the challenge to a state's authority to prohibit a 
woman's access to medical termination of her pregnancy. The pivotal 
question in an abortion case can be stated to be whether a fetus is human 
life as of conception. If this question is answered in the affirmative, the 
woman's rights of personal privacy become secondary to the interests 
of the state in preserving human life. The Court struggled to get away 
from this statement of the issue and argued that it "need not resolve 
the difficult question of when life begins."69 The Court aclmowledged the 
conflict in philosophical judgments on this question and turned to a dis-
cussion of privacy rights versus compelling state interests in promoting 
the health of the mother and, finally, in the potentidity of human life.60 
By including references to "potentiality" of life, however, the opinion 
was seemingly bodnd to the philosophical question in that the decision 
involved a direcl: conclusion in regard to that question. This fact 
prompted Justice Rehnquist in his dissent to accuse the majority of 
judicial legislation61 while pointing out that "the very existence of the 
debate is evidence that the 'right' to an abortion is not so universally 
accepted as the appellants would have us believe."62 
Abortion is at least temporarily a settled issue, and any new analysis 
or new perspective is assisted by the analogies already accepted by the 
majority. Even though an advocate favoring broader rights to abortion 
must avoid being enmeshed in the "fetus issue," this statement of the 
crucial issue for abortion is important since it involves descriptive 
language recognized to be applicable. It has been recognized that, when 
broken down to its basics, this issue asks the legal question of whether 
the fetus is similar enough to you and me to be offered the same protec-
tions. 03 This phrasing removes the possible confusion engendered by 
the use of the terms "human being" or "human life." To argue the 
58410 u.s. 113 (1973). 
50 !d. at 159. 
oo !d. at 146-47. 
01 !d. at 173-74. 
02 !d. at 174. 
o3 McCoy, supra note 5, at 1289. 
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negative using the "human life" phrasing appears irrational since a 
fetus is some sort of life or being as a matter of common sense. 
What common sense may not tell us is that the term "life" carries with 
it an implicit human decision as to the value of life.64 When used in 
reference to humans, "life" really means protected life in the minds of 
those using the term. This specific form of life is considered a higher 
and more valued form, but essentially is protected for very practical 
reasons having to do with the wants and needs of the individuals com-
prising this society. 
One of these is the recognized need for order in the society and 
protection of its individual members from harm. We assume that the 
devaluing of the lives of members of society would create havoc and 
destroy the orderly progression towards society's goals. This assump-
tion is bolstered by ideas of democracy which place importance upon 
the individual members of society as opposed to some favored group 
or class. For whatever reasons, the basic intersubjective agreement 
within this society is that its members are to be protected in their ability 
to continue existing. A reason for this decision is that if such life is 
not protected in general, the danger for each individual increases. We, 
as individuals, agree to protect others in the society for the·very basic 
reason that we wish to be protected ourselves. 
The societal need for the protection of life is inextricably tied not 
only to self-protection, but to the perceived danger to that self-protection. 
We often act in accordance with what we perceive as a threat, and these 
perceptions control the way in which society orders its members.85 
The major way in which such danger is perceived is through physical 
harm or death caused to individuals whom we see as similar to our-
selves. There is never the same emotional upset in hearing of deaths 
in distant countries, for instance, as there is in hearing of the death of 
individuals in our own community. In addition, we can only share this 
feeling of similarity with others through our conceived sharing of 
conscious experiences.66 The death of a lawyer brings greater unease to 
other similarly aged lawyers than the death of some less similar person. 
We cannot feel the same similarity to the lives of lesser animals since 
there is no possible concept of the conscious experiencing as a lesser 
64 See Rosen v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 318 F. Supp. 1217, 1236 
& n.8 (E.D. La. 1970) ; McCoy, supra note 5, at 1288-S9. 
65 Cf. MacLeod, The Phello111e11ological Approach to Social Psychology, in PERSON 
PERCEPTION AND INTERPERSONAL BEHAVIOR 33, 45 (R. Tagiuri & L. Petrullo eds. 1958). 
66 See id. at 44-45; cf. Husserl, Phenomenology and Anthropology, in REALISM AND 
THE BACKGROUND OF PHENOMENOLOGY 120-21, 138 (R. Chisholm ed. 1960). 
1975] JUDICIAL REASONING AND SOCIAL CHANGE 275 
animal. We, therefore, do not protect their lives and can readily accept 
the deaths of animals, especially when such serves our own needs or the 
needs of others. The experience of collective consciousness with the 
categories of lesser and greater similarity is a crucially important deter-
minant of our behavior with reference to others and ultimately for the 
way in which the social world is organized by and for us.67 
We begin by needing or wanting to exist and thereafter collectively 
seek to ward off any perceived threat to that need or want. On the other 
hand, our perception of the devaluation of life in particular instances can 
raise our level of tolerance for that and further devaluation. In the 
criminal abortion reform case the question is whether the termination 
of pregnancy and the destruction of the fetus devalues our form of 
life in the eyes or through the perception of the individuals in our 
society. The perceived danger comes not simply from what the law may 
do, but from what others may do to us. Should the tolerance for death 
and killing rise in the society, our own existence becomes more of a 
precarious venture. 
The question of whether a fetus is similar to you and me comes 
down to whether we can perceive similarity through conception of a 
shared consciousness. "Conception" in this sense i3 the subjective act 
of an individual as opposed to what he is told to believe. Thus, where 
empathy stops, so stops our conception of similarity.68 The knowledge 
that a fetus will ordinarily be born into the world and the fact that at a 
certain stage it takes on the form of a human baby are influences to be 
considered. This knowledge does not, however, prompt society to sur-
round the death of -a fetus with the same formality as even that of the 
newly born baby. The distinction lies in the fact that not only can we 
see the baby, but we can also conceive of its consciou-; wonder at its new 
life. Although there can be only a dim remembrance of our own ex-
perience at such an early stage, there can be at least a conceived sharing 
of those experiences with the baby. 
The fetus is removed from any perception of similarity in that it is 
unavailable for any human attachments and is not visible, and no one 
can readily conceive of conscious experiences in the womb. The failure 
61 Cf. D. BElir, supra note 16, at 6. 
es In the case of other peoples we are able to conceive of sha•·ed experiences through 
the spread of cultural information. The fact may be that we undustand other people and 
their basic similarity to ourselves, but deny this fact for different reasons through re-
course to superficial distinctions. In effect, others may be seen <"S dissimilar because of 
the stereotypes used to bring order into our lives and not because we cannot conceive of a 
conscious sharing of experiences. The difference is that to conceive of this similarity, 
we need facts; in the case of the fetus, we can only theorize. 
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of human conception at this point is precisely why philosophical and 
religious theory plays such a large part in deciding this question. Because 
we cannot know of the similarity ourselves, someone must tell us that 
it does exist. 
Because of the absence of any perceived similarity, the termination 
of pregnancy and the destruction of the fetus is unlikely to brutalize 
our society and thereby endanger our own existence. On the other 
hand, the law's disregard for the plight of many of those affected by 
the prohibition of safe medical abortion has its own brutalizing effect 
upon individuals who see and begin to accept this type of callousness. 
For purposes of the law there are distinct and medically provable points 
upon the continuum of pregnancy at which lines can be drawn in light 
of the need for order and self-protection, which can allow for safe 
and inexpensive methods of meeting the problems of the women affected. 
The existence of the controversy surrounding abortion is evidence 
that there is no universal acceptance of either answer to the fetus-as-
human-life question. Because law follows the collective will, the creation 
and evaluation of normative rules is a social decision both ·in its scope 
and in its basis.69 When substantial debate reveals an establisN.ed modi-
fication in that collective will in regard to a particular issue, an ap-
pellate court cannot remain unaffected. In order to remain in accordance 
with collective agreements which give law its validity and strength, the 
court must solve the problem presented in a way which does not require 
a value choice directly in the stated area of conflict. A new relevance 
must be found to other areas of the established law-established and 
representative of the collective wilP0 
An initial conceptual difficulty which must be met is the tendency 
to equate legislative decisions with the collective will. Such an equiva-
lence would automatically justify every statute. Statutes and court-
made law reflect the collective will only in the ideal sense. In reality, 
law as seen in statutes or in court opinions is only evidence of the col-
lective will. Also, no one issue will ever be resolvable by direct reference 
to an actual universal agreement among the members of a society. This 
is to say that the collective will is an ideal to be used as a guide in 
decisionmaking. To speak of objectivity and value neutrality in regard 
to decisionmaking is not to describe reality; yet in progress toward 
these ideals higher degrees of fairness and justice result. 
Analogy to other law provides, in the abortion case, evidence of 
69 See ]. BRKIC, supra note 41, at 151. 
70 See Levy-Bruhl, supra note 54, at 673. 
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the real perceptions of society as a whole on the fetus issue. The Court 
in Roe held that a fetus could not be considered a "person" under the 
fourteenth amendment, as was argued for the Texas law, and noted 
that in nearly all the instances in which the term "person" was used in 
the United States Constitution, it has application only postnatally.11 
Article 1205 of the Texas Penal Code reads, in part, "The person 
upon whom the homicide is alleged to have been committed must be in 
existence by actual birth."72 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals 
stated in a 1971 abortion case that this language "is an implicit recogni-
tion of human life not in existence by actual birth. ''73 Here again, the 
implicit asumption of value attached to "human lift:" works to confuse 
matters. Article 1205 may well imply that something exists prior to 
the time of birth, but an express exclusion from the definition of homicide 
does not imply that protection should be provided to what is excluded. 
By reading the homicide and abortion laws as consistent, the court cuts 
off any ability to test separately the rationality of the abortion statute 
but, in effect, justifies that law by the fact of its existence. Why did the 
State of Texas enact homicide statutes defining a human being as one 
who is in existence by actual birth? This was, was it not, because of a 
subtle collective sense or reason which determined that this definition 
included all those who need be protected. 
If the intuitive reason of the people in general resulted in the con-
ception of a fetus as a human being, abortion would be included as a 
type of homicide. A reason for separate handling might be the excep-
tion of abortions procured by medical advice to save the life of the 
pregnant female. Texas, however, also does not penalize those who 
commit homicides under certain circumstances. By excepting certain 
abortions rather than classifying them as justifiable homicides, Texas 
denies the fetus due process of law. The determimtion of justifiable 
homicide is made by prosecutors and grand juries, but "justifiable" 
abortion is the determination of medical experts. \Vhy are not those 
pregnant women and their medical experts required to submit to the 
established legal processes before they kill a human 'being? 
Until1967, the civil law of Texas did not allow recovery of damages 
11410 U.S. at 157 (1973). 
72TEx. PENAL CoDE ANN. art 1205 (1961). The new Texa; Penal Code, effective 
Jan. 1, 1974, reads, "'Individual' means a human being who has teen born and is alive." 
TEX. PENAL CoDE ANN. § 1.07(a) (17) (1974). References in text are to the Te%as 
Peual Code of 1925, in effect when Roe was decided. 
13 See Thompson v. State, 493 S.W.2d 913, 919 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971), vacated, 410 
u.s. 950 (1973). 
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for the death of a child due to prenatal injuries caused by negligence.14. 
In 1967, the Texas Supreme Court held that a viable infant born alive 
would have had a cause of action had it survived and, therefore, the 
parents could recover under the Texas wrongful death statute.15 The 
reasoning of that opinion strongly supports the conclusion that the deci-
sion was dependent on a live birth, although the court expressly reserved 
this question. In the dissent to the lower appellate court opinion in that 
case, Justice Cadena made the following statement in footnote: 
The absurdity of the doctrine that the unborn child is but a part of 
its mother is obvious. It is not uncommon today for a living infant 
to be born after the death of the mother. This would not be pos-
sible if, as the courts were once wont to insist, the child was only 
part of the mother and had no separate existence.16 
Justice Cadena failed to note that it is also not common today for 
other living parts of the body to be removed from a person after death. 
The distinction is that at birth almost everyone, consciously or uncon-
sciously, perceives that a human being has come into existence for the 
first time. This perception is further evidenced by the common descrip-
tion of birth as "a beginning." 
If the evidence provided above supports as more reasonable the 
conclusion that the people of Texas do not actually perceive of a fetus as 
human life, a separate and distinct rational basis must be provided to 
justify this governmental intrusion into individual decisionmaking. 
The abortion statute cannot be justified on the same basis as a murder 
statute or on the basis that a fetus is some form of mystical half-life. 
The Court in Roe found a valid state interest in the protection of the 
"potentiality of life" at viability because the fetus then has the capability 
of meaningfullife.77 It did not explain why this "capability" is deter-
minative. If "potentiality" is viewed as the potential existence of pro-
tected life, this holding is that a state is justified in protecting something 
now because the state would be justified in protecting it later (at birth). 
A state interest in the potentiality of protected life can only be an interest 
in the quantity or quality of future additions to the existing members 
of society (protected life )-population control. If a state cannot justify 
its intrusion into the personal lives of its citizens on this ground, the 
14 Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W.2d 944 (1935). 
15 Leal v. C. C. Pitts Sand and Gravel, Inc., 419 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. 1967). See also 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 161-62. 
16 Leal v. C. C. Pitts Sand and Gravel, Inc., 413 S.W.2d 825, 829 n.16a (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1967). 
11410 U.S. at 163. 
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issue becomes solely one of whether or not state3 need justify their 
action at all in these cases. 
The Obscenity Issue 
The attempt to describe the abortion problem in a way which gives 
rise to a changed perspective is made easier by the fact that the Court 
provided authoritative direction. The "intractable" obscenity problem, 
however, is not as easy. The authoritative view reflected in the new 
obscenity opinions is a hardening of the legal support for those who 
wish to prohibit exhibitions or descriptions of se..'>:ual conduct. In Miller 
v. Califomia/8 the Court, per Justice Burger, set out the following 
guidelines for the trier of fact in an obscenity case: 
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary com-
munity standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, 
appeals to the prurient interest . • . ; (b) whether the work 
depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,, sexual conduct 
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether 
the work, taken as' a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, 
or scientific value.19 
The opinion denies the applicability of the "utterly without redeeming 
social value" test of Memoirs v. Massachusetts80 and also states that 
"community standards" are not national standards bLtt those of the com-
munity as reflected by a jury.81 
In a companion case, Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,82 Justice 
Brennan in dissent disagreed with the view that a ;;tate could constitu-
tionally suppress "obscene" films "even if they were displayed only to 
persons over the age of 21 who were aware of the nature of their con-
tents and who had consented to viewing them."83 He described in great 
detail the frustrating history of the attempt to formulate a definition of 
material not protected by the first amendment, and h:! concluded that the 
court must instead focus on the sufficiency of the state's interests for 
intervention in this area. 
What is "obscenity" and why has the Supreme Court had such 
difficulty in defining it? Justice Douglas stated that it is "at most . . . 
18 413 u.s. 15 (1973). 
19/d. at 24. 
80 Id., rcjecti11g A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" 
v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413 (1966). 
81413 U.S. at 31. 
82413 u.s. 49 (1973). 
88/d. at 78. 
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the expression of offensive ideas."8~ Others argue that "obscenity" refers 
to depicitions or descriptions of human sexual activity which are to be 
excluded from the protection of the first amendment. Justice Brennan 
noted in passing that the Court's refusal to give protection to such ex-
pression was thought to be a reflection of the universal judgment that 
it should be restrained.8 G 
Is it reasonable to assume that such a perplexing problem of defini-
tion could arise if there were universal agreement as to what should be 
punishable? How can we as a society agree to punish what we cannot 
describ~ or define? Given the freedom to define what should be punish-
able, a part of the population could easily agree to a very precise defini-
tion. They might describe all sexually oriented material; Justice 
Brennan and others might exclude material which had social, political, 
or artistic attributes even though primarily concerned with sexual 
activity. A significant segment of the population might well refuse to 
describe or define any sexually oriented material as punishable. It is, in 
fact, this diversity of opinion or value judgments and the lack of any-
thing approaching universal agreement which make impossible an 
efficient and value-neutral definition of obscenity. Judges and legal 
scholars inay try as they will, but any product will ring false because it 
will be a direct value choice for society, not by society. 
If there ever were universal agreement to suppress all sexually 
oriented expression, there would be little problem with definition. As 
exceptions become necessary, definition becomes more difficult. These 
exceptions become necessary when a significant part of society recognizes 
the worth of some sexually oriented expression. This more complicated 
definition, in turn, reflects the breakdown of any universal agreement 
and the beginnings of controversy. The controversy causes stress 
between those seeking total suppression and those seeking to save what 
they see as valuable. The intensification of the controversy causes the 
history of frustrating attempts at resolution of the problem. A direct 
value clash arises with the emergence of the opinion that sexually ori-
ented expression has value in itself as a way of alleviating the frustra-
tions and anxieties caused by conditioning in regard to sexual matters. 
This makes untenable a compromise on the specific conflict of value 
judgments. To change the issue from a description of that conflict will 
bring about the charge that the court avoids "the" issue or the "correct" 
statement of the issue. Courts must, however, solve problems; part of 
S4Jd. at 71. 
ss !d. at 105. 
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their effort to do so has traditionally been concerned with stating legal 
issues in a way which allows of resolution. 86 
One line of reasoning is that which justifies Justice Brennan's 
suggested focus on the legitimacy of the state's interest. He has noted 
in passing that the imposition of what a person considers to be obscene 
has all the characteristics of a physical assault and may constitute an 
invasion of his privacy.81 Justice Burger, in explaining the new test, 
repeatedly described the punishable expression as that which is patently 
offensive.88 The point is that a person because of social conditioning 
can be physically and emotionally shocked when ·;ubjected to what he 
deems obscene. Whether another person thinks I-1e should be shocked 
or not is irrelevant. Those holding to a traditional view are essentially 
defining what is shocking and harmful to them in this situation because 
of their particular, but not unique, nature. This hc:1,rm, even though not 
universally experienced, is the basis for state intervention. There is, 
undeniably, a legitimate state interest in protecting citizens from this 
personal harm. On the other hand, there is no basis for suppression 
where this harm is not likely to be experienced except by consent. A per-
son possessing pornographic material in his home does not pose any 
such danger to others. 89 Commercial material and exhibitions which do 
not intrude on the usual public thoroughfares and which are viewed only 
after consent of the audience do not invade upon the citizens' right to be 
free from personal harm. 
The only reasonable basis for the interest of the state is the pro-
tection of a person's right to consent before exposure, which includes 
the right of parents to consent for their minor children. Punishment 
arising from this state interest is justified only for exhibitions which 
violate the right to consent, not for the act of expression or ex-
hibition itself. A definition of that which requires consent can include 
any sexually oriented material irrespective of its attributed value. In 
this way, Justice Brennan's suggested approach doef not preclude "those 
governments from taking action to serve what may be strong and legit-
imate interests through regulation of the manner of distribution of 
sexually oriented material."90 Stating the issue in relation to legitimate 
B6 See text accompanying notes 53-55 supra. It should also be noted that recognition 
of an insoluble statement of the issue does not decide the case since each side has the 
opportunity to propose its own revised statement. 
81413 U.S. at 106-07. 
B8413 U.S. at 24-25. 
89 This view was given constitutional imprimatur in tanl·~Y v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 
557, 567 (1969). 
oo 413 U.S. at 113 (emphasis added). 
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interests as described also opens avenues for more efficiently alleviating 
"the substantial damage to constitutional rights and to this Nation's 
judicial machinery that inevitably results from state efforts to bar the 
distribution even of unprotected material to consenting adults."91 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Since I have chastised tradition for its subtle control of modern 
decisions, I should also make explicit some of the assumptions under-
lying this discussion. The most fundamental of these is my assuming as 
valid a conclusion that human reasoning cannot be said to yield up 
ultimate truths. This is similar to John Dewey's argument that in a 
changing society the logic of judicial decision must be one of "prediction 
of probabilities rather than one of deduction of certainties.1192 Proposi-
tions held valid in law cannot be held valid as ultimate or ontological 
truths without assuming that mankind has perfect knowledge of that part 
of existence described in the proposition. I assume that we have imper-
fect know1edge of both our existence and of our tools for gaining and 
for describing that knowledge. This, however, is not to say that we 
should not use reasoning as our best tool for seeking greater understand-
ing. In this sense, any proposition can only be said to contain the best 
description of our best estimate of the truth of the situation. 
When necessary, we must be able to recognize these imperfections 
and be able to ad just prescriptive decisions in accordance with a changed 
knowledge and perspective of the situations to which those decisions 
relate. The practical demands on the time and efforts of the court 
system require that there be a large degree of certainty and that "hard," 
mechanical reasoning work efficiently. On occasion, however, the 
practical requirement that courts serve society as it is today requires 
flexibility as to that certainty and the mechanics of its application. To 
recognize a need for flexibility in the tools of law on these o_ccasions 
does not require that all law become questionable. It is only when the 
effect of law causes a social disruption as evidenced by a serious con-
troversy in regard to fundamental change that reexamination need 
occur. Courts are dependent in this way on the social action which brings 
an issue into controversy since they cannot adopt a cautious stance for 
every minute outcry against the status quo. 
I have approached the different matters considered with a view 
toward their operation, use, influence, and effect. This was to compen-
91 I d. at 112-13. 
92 Dewey, supra note 56, at 26. 
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sate for what can be called the ontological pre~.umption inherent in 
definitions of what something is. In order to remain critical, I did not 
begin the examination by removing from the problem what I think is 
known. There is also a tendency in definition of matters to introduce 
one's own value judgments into what appears as a ~tructural description. 
Reason was described as a persuasive aspect of argument and as a tool 
for resolving legal problems, not as a thing or as a property somehow 
more valuable than emotion. 
The different descriptive terminology used to change the perspec-
tive as to the legal questions represents an eclectic gathering of infor-
mation from other disciplines. My belief is that present discussions of 
interdisciplinary approaches to law are essentially concerned with the 
expansion of the perceptions of lawmakers through presentation of the 
findings from other established methodologies. In this way, legal 
methods can become more incisive and thereby more effective in 
achieving the unique goals of law. 
In considering abortion and obscenity, I assumed that courts may 
properly decide these matters on their merits. In the context of sub-
stantial social controversy, I cannot find any justification for allowing 
such legislative acts to stand if they have ·no rational basis in the needs 
of the people as a whole. This rational basis is the only clear distinction 
between our law and that of the Nazi government of Germany. The 
court system also provides the only forum for reasoned testing of this 
rationality since a legislature must hold with the majority view. Where 
a significant number of people perceive a particular law as oppressive and 
unfair, failure to seriously consider their grievances is detrimental to a 
society ordered primarily through respect for law and to the ultimate 
legitimacy of law itself. 
The law, peculiarly among disciplines, seeks legitimacy through 
realization of the basic and therefore universal needs of individuals 
living in a fluid yet cohesive group; it is only through reason that basic 
needs, which in the societal aggregate give rise to the collective will, can 
be distinguished from superficial interests. 
